Post by arfanho7 on Feb 24, 2024 1:55:56 GMT -5
Once committed to a certain quality tier either high or low in one product line it is usually more costly to offer another product line in a different quality tier instead of offering it in the same tier. This paper probes the strategic implications of this combination of brand stickiness and operational complexity for duopoly competition. Author Abstract Many multi product firms incur a complexity fixed cost when offering different product lines in different quality tiers relative to the case when offering all products lines in the same quality tier high or low.
Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms’ choices of quality tiers across different product lines even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this interdependency on equilibrium profits in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both firms’ profits are weakly higher when the complexity Egypt WhatsApp Number List cost is infinite than when it is . The Stackelberg leader’s profits are always weakly higher with a positive complexity fixed cost but its profits can be non monotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower’s profits can be lower when the complexity fixed cost is positive than when it is equal to . Paper Information Full Working Paper Text pdf Working Paper Publication Date July.
HBS Working Paper Number Faculty Unit s Strategy WORKPLACE BIASED AGAINST INTROVERTS FEB RESEARCH IDEAS BREAKING THROUGH THE SELF DOUBT THAT KEEPS TALENTED WOMEN FROM LEADING FEB RESEARCH IDEAS THE MIDDLE MANAGER OF THE FUTURE MORE COACHING LESS COMMANDING JAN OP ED WHY BOEING’S PROBLEMS WITH THE MAX BEGAN MORE THAN YEARS AGO JAN RESEARCH IDEAS MORE PROOF THAT MONEY CAN BUY HAPPINESS OR A LIFE WITH LESS STRESS FIND RELATED ARTICLES Strategy Duopoly and Oligopoly Supply Chain Management.
Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms’ choices of quality tiers across different product lines even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this interdependency on equilibrium profits in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both firms’ profits are weakly higher when the complexity Egypt WhatsApp Number List cost is infinite than when it is . The Stackelberg leader’s profits are always weakly higher with a positive complexity fixed cost but its profits can be non monotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower’s profits can be lower when the complexity fixed cost is positive than when it is equal to . Paper Information Full Working Paper Text pdf Working Paper Publication Date July.
HBS Working Paper Number Faculty Unit s Strategy WORKPLACE BIASED AGAINST INTROVERTS FEB RESEARCH IDEAS BREAKING THROUGH THE SELF DOUBT THAT KEEPS TALENTED WOMEN FROM LEADING FEB RESEARCH IDEAS THE MIDDLE MANAGER OF THE FUTURE MORE COACHING LESS COMMANDING JAN OP ED WHY BOEING’S PROBLEMS WITH THE MAX BEGAN MORE THAN YEARS AGO JAN RESEARCH IDEAS MORE PROOF THAT MONEY CAN BUY HAPPINESS OR A LIFE WITH LESS STRESS FIND RELATED ARTICLES Strategy Duopoly and Oligopoly Supply Chain Management.
